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Abstract
While Algeria’s rulers bear much of the 
responsibility for the lack of democratic 
reform after the advent of formal par-
ty-political pluralism in 1989, the political 
forces notionally engaged in constitu-
tional opposition have their share. This 
judgment applies in particular to the Front 
des Forces Socialistes (FFS).  Finally legal-
ised in 1989, the FFS from its foundation 
in 1963 has provided the main template of 
‘opposition’ in Algeria but it has not been 
engaged in genuine opposition, merely 
dissidence. Media commentary and aca-
demic analysis have attributed democratic 
credentials and reforming ambitions to 
the FFS on the strength of its discourse, 
while ignoring the way the party has actu-
ally behaved. This flawed approach has 
also built upon earlier errors in the anal-
ysis of the FFS by the French sociologist 
Jeanne Favret, who misconceived the 1963 
rebellion as representing the ‘ultra-mod-
ernism’ of the Kabyle middle class and 
misunderstood the role of tradition in 
this affair. This paper examines the party’s 
behaviour since 1989 and the logics of the 
rebellion of 1963–5, and explains how and 
why the FFS has always fallen short of 
opposing the government with a serious 
democratic project.
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A Funeral in Kabylia
On 2 January 2016, tens of thousands of Algerians1 stood witness to a historic event, the 
funeral of Hocine Aït Ahmed, the founder of the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS)2 in 
1963 and its leader until 2013, who had died, aged 89, at his home in Lausanne. Ten days 
later he was buried next to his mother3 in the hamlet that bears the family name, Ath 
Ahmed,4 a short distance from the large village of Taqa in the ʿarsh Ath Yahia,5 near Aïn 
el-Hammam in the mountains of Greater Kabylia. 
Kabylia is the home of Algeria’s largest Berber-speaking population. Approximately 25 
percent of Algeria’s population (around 40 million in 2016) are Berber-speakers and 
Kabyles account for about 7 of those 10 million.6 As the most densely inhabited region in 
North Africa outside the towns, with the possible exception of Egypt’s Nile Delta, Kabylia 
has long had a tradition of commercial and labour out-migration and Kabyles have been 
disproportionately represented in the population of Algiers since the Ottoman era, in the 
Algerian diaspora in France and Belgium since the early 1900s and, in recent decades, in 
other parts of Europe and in North America. 
Kabyle activists were prominent in the nationalist movement which developed amongst 
the migrant workers in France from the 1920s onwards and in Algeria from 1937, and 
played a major role in the war of independence of 1954–62. The first congress of the Front 
de Libération Nationale (FLN) was held in the Soummam valley in Kabylia in August 1956 
and at that point Kabyles dominated the FLN leadership. It was a Kabyle, Abane Ramdane, 
who emerged as the FLN’s principal political brain in 1955–6 and another Kabyle, Belkacem 
Krim, not only created the guerrilla networks of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) 
in Kabylia (wilaya7 III of the ALN) and hosted the Soummam Congress but also sent his 
lieutenants Amar Ouamrane and Ali Mellah to establish the ALN in wilaya IV (Algérois) 
and wilaya VI (southern Algeria) respectively. From late 1955 onwards, the Abane–Krim 
1  The Algerian press spoke of numbers as high as 1–200,000; El Watan, 2 January 2016.
2  In Arabic: Jebhat al-Quwā al-Ishtirakiyya; in Thamazighth (Berber): Tirni Iyallen Inemlayen.
3  Mustapha Benfodil, ‘Aït Ahmed en sa terre éternelle’, El Watan, 31 December 2015.
4  ‘Aït Ahmed’ is how his name was recorded in the colonial era État Civil and how all sources refer to 
him but ‘Aït’ is a French deformation of the Berber word, meaning ‘the sons of ’, which is actually pro-
nounced Ath in Kabylia, as some authors, local authorities and the press are finally acknowledging.
5  An ʿarsh is a group of villages forming a stable political community; in the pre-colonial period such 
communities were sovereign. For a discussion, see Hugh Roberts, Berber Government: The Kabyle Polity 
in Pre-Colonial Algeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014; p/b 2017), pp. 43–9.
6  The second largest Berber population are the Chaouia of eastern Algeria, who also played an important 
part in the War of Independence. The other Berber populations are the Mzabis, inhabitants of the five 
cities of the Wad Mzab in the northern Sahara and two other cities outside the valley; the Ichenwiyen of 
the Chenoua massif west of Algiers, and the Tuareg of the far south. Much smaller Berber populations 
exist in the Wad Righ and the Gourara regions in the Sahara and in parts of north-western Algeria. All 
Algeria’s Berbers are Sunni Muslims of the Maliki madhhab except the Mzabis, who are Ibadis.
7  Wilaya can mean responsibility, charge, command, and/or the territorial extent of such an authority 
(for example, a province). The FLN divided Algeria into six wilayat, that is military commands. Since 
independence the term is used to mean ‘governorate’, of which there are currently 48.
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leadership, hegemonic inside Algeria, was in conflict with the external delegation, 
headed by Ahmed Ben Bella, in Cairo, but following the capture of Ben Bella and his col-
leagues, including Aït Ahmed, in October 1956 (when French fighter aircraft forced down 
their plane at Algiers) and the flight of Abane, Krim and other members of the internal 
leadership from Algiers to various safe havens in February 1957, a new line of cleavage 
appeared, with Krim joining Abane’s critics and approving his eventual liquidation. Krim 
was initially the Number 1 of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne 
(GPRA) formed in 1958, but he and the Kabyles as a group lost control over the ALN in 
1958–9, a development consolidated by the rise of Houari Boumediène as Chief of the 
General Staff in 1960. 
With the crisis of the GPRA in the summer of 1962, the Ben Bella–Boumediène alliance 
was sealed and it was primarily with troops of Boumediène’s ‘army of the frontiers’ based 
in Morocco and Tunisia that Ben Bella came to power, the forces of wilaya III and wilaya 
IV being hostile to this development and providing most of the FFS rebellion’s troops the 
following year. After the failure of the rebellion, the dissident wing of the Kabyle intelli-
gentsia would eventually invest heavily in the Amazigh (Berber) identity issue. In 1990–1 
Kabylia was the main region resisting the appeal of Islamist parties, and since then it has 
harboured a variety of political outlooks expressing disaffection vis-à-vis the government 
in Algiers. 
In choosing his native village as his final resting place, Aït Ahmed was refusing the gov-
ernment’s offer of an alternative which would have accorded him recognition as a major 
national figure. As one of the so-called ‘nine historic chiefs’ credited with founding the 
FLN,8 he unquestionably had a claim to a prominent place in El-Alia cemetery in Algiers, 
the traditional burial place of Algeria’s national heroes. In rejecting the government’s 
overtures, Aït Ahmed was understood to be giving priority to the role he had played in 
Algerian political life since independence, as the founder and leader of the FFS.
The Front des Forces Socialistes 
‘Le FFS’ is the name of an organisation licensed by the Algerian government as an ‘asso-
ciation of a political character’ under Article 40 of the 1989 constitution and, like other 
organisations so licensed, is widely referred to as a political party. Whether it deserves 
to be called a political party is open to question. It has never campaigned for socialist 
demands or policies but has nonetheless been a member of the Socialist International 
since 1996.9 The Algerian press routinely refers to it as ‘Algeria’s oldest opposition party’.
8  The ‘nine historic chiefs’ were: Mohammed Khider (1912–67), Ahmed Ben Bella (1916–2011), Mostefa 
Ben Boulaïd (1917–56), Mohammed Boudiaf (1919–92), Mourad Didouche (1922–55), Belkacem Krim 
(1922–70), Larbi Ben M’Hidi (1923–57), Rabah Bitat (1925–2000) and Hocine Aït Ahmed (1926–2015). 
Three of these (Didouche, Krim and Aït Ahmed), were Kabyles. Captured with Ben Bella, Boudiaf and 
Khider in October 1956, Aït Ahmed spent the rest of the war in French custody.
9  It had previously become a candidate member in 1992.
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That this opposition was grounded in a commitment to democratic principles was widely 
affirmed in the tributes paid to Aït Ahmed at his death. The national daily El Watan 
described him as a ‘pioneer of the opposition to the regime’10 and as ‘a fierce and untiring 
fighter for democracy’,11 judgments echoed by numerous prominent personalities.12 But, 
if Aït Ahmed’s credentials as a fighter for democracy were unanimously endorsed, it was 
also recognised that his combat had fallen short of its objective. As El Watan put it, ‘the 
immense political leader that he was departs without having seen the realisation of the 
ideal of a state bound by law and the respect for liberty to which he dedicated nearly 70 
years of his life.’13
A question that no one raised in public in late December 2015 or early January 2016 is 
whether there had been a relationship of cause and effect between the political activity of 
Aït Ahmed and the FFS on the one hand and the continued absence of democracy, rule of 
law and respect for human rights in Algeria on the other. This is not because Aït Ahmed 
and the FFS have not had their critics. Critical commentaries on both have surfaced at 
intervals over the years. In 2002, the website Kabyle.com published a polemic by a former 
FFS activist under the title ‘Aït Ahmed décortiqué’ [Aït Ahmed dissected].14 In 2014, the 
Kabyle journalist Lounis Aggoun published an equally vigorous attack.15 More than 20 
years earlier, a whole book, published in Algeria, was devoted to dissecting Aït Ahmed’s 
discourse and interrogating his political strategy, without encountering any attempt at 
refutation.16 Other critiques could be cited.
It is understandable that such discordant voices were not audible during the national 
communion of loss following Aït Ahmed’s death. Even if President Bouteflika had not 
decreed eight days of national mourning,17 it was to be expected that the death of the 
last of the ‘nine historic chiefs’ would be the occasion for a full display of Algerian una-
nimisme and that personalities, including former first secretaries of the FFS, who were 
known to have had serious disagreements with Aït Ahmed and in some cases to have quit 
10  Saïd Rabia, ‘Après le combat contre le colonialisme, Aït Ahmed, pionnier de l’opposition au pouvoir’, 
El Watan, 24 December 2015.
11  Samir Ghezlaoui, ‘70 ans au service de l’idéal national’, El Watan, 24 December 2015.
12  These included Abdennour Ali Yahia, founder and first president of the Ligue Algérienne pour la 
Défense des Droits de l’Homme (LADDH), former prime ministers Mouloud Hamrouche and Ali 
Benflis, former Secretary General of the Party of the FLN Abdelaziz Belkhadem, the leader of the Parti 
des Travailleurs Louisa Hanoune,  the prominent journalist Abed Charef and the eminent sociologist 
Lahouari Addi; see articles in El Watan, 24 December 2015; Le Quotidien d’Oran, 31 December 2015 and 
the website Algeria-Watch, 6 January 2016.
13  Ghezlaoui, ‘70 ans au service de l’idéal national’, El Watan.
14  Hakim Adjissa, ‘Aït Ahmed décortiqué’, Kabyle.com, 2 October 2002. Available at http://www.kabyle.
com/forum/salon-discussions-générales/4893-ait-ahmed-decortique-article-extrement-interessant.
html.
15  Lounis Aggoun, ‘Hocine Aït-Ahmed, l’albatros déplumé’, Études Coloniales-revue en ligne, 3 March 2013. 
Available at http://etudescoloniales.canalblog.com/archives/2013/03/03/26575854.html.
16  Mohamed Boudjema, FFS: Fatalité ou Faiblesse, Aït Ahmed Se Confesse (Batna, Algeria: Mohammed At 
Ivrahim Éditeur, 1992).
17  Algérie Presse Service, 24 December 2015.
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his party à grand fracas,18 would leave those issues to one side while paying their respects. 
But to suggest that the Algerian state’s failure to amount to a democracy in which the rule 
of law guarantees respect for human rights is entirely the fault of the government is to 
imply that Algeria’s opposition parties have been blameless, their democratic credentials 
unimpeachable and their strategies immaculate. These notions are unrealistic; Algeria’s 
opposition parties are not above criticism and what holds good in general holds good for 
the FFS in particular, given precisely its status as ‘Algeria’s oldest opposition party’ and 
thus an example for those that came after it.
The FFS bears a substantial responsibility for the absence of democracy in Algeria. This 
is because it has postured as a party of democratic reform without actually being one; it 
has not really been in the business of opposition, merely that of dissidence. Moreover, its 
dissidence has been founded not on doctrine, that is, on a set of beliefs (as in the Dis-
senting tradition within British Protestantism), but on a sense of frustrated entitlement. 
The FFS has been preoccupied not with the question of how Algeria and the Algerian 
people should be governed – an inquiry that could have led it to advocate and campaign 
for democratic proposals – but the very different question, that of legitimacy: who has the 
right to rule? 
It would be a mistake to suppose that the party’s preoccupation with the issue of legiti-
macy has been a consequence of its own evolution from what McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
call ‘transgressive contention’ to what they call ‘contained contention’.19 The FFS that has 
existed within the law since 1989 has certainly been engaged in a kind of contained con-
tention that has fallen short of genuine democratic agitation. But to call the FFS ‘Algeria’s 
oldest opposition party’ is to date its existence from September 1963, when Hocine Aït 
Ahmed and his associates proclaimed the existence of the FFS in public meetings held, in 
Kabylia and the Algérois, to denounce and challenge the regime of Algeria’s first president, 
Ahmed Ben Bella. 
The FFS was, at its inception, engaged in transgressive contention, since the act of pub-
licly proclaiming its existence transgressed the new rule imposed by the regime that there 
could be only one party in Algeria, the ‘Party of the FLN’ (PFLN),20 and no organisations 
might exist outside its purview and authoritative supervision. It can be said to have sus-
tained this ‘transgressive’ position not only during its revolt in Algeria (September 1963 to 
June 1965) but also during the years when it was active primarily in exile (1966–89), and 
thus for 26 years in total, for as long as the regime maintained its own profile as a ‘one-
party state’. But, when the regime of President Chadli Bendjedid introduced the formally 
pluralist constitution in February 1989, with its famous Article 40, it transformed the rules 
of the game and the context in which the FFS had its being. 
18  Notably Saïd Khelil, Mustapha Bouhadef and Karim Tabbou, who all paid unalloyed tribute to their 
former chief; see ‘Réactions’, El Watan, 24 December 2015.
19  Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2001), pp. 7–9.
20  I use the acronym PFLN to distinguish the ‘party’ created by regime fiat after independence from the 
revolutionary movement (FLN) which secured this independence.
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The end of the PFLN’s monopoly of party-political activity created a major opportunity 
for the FFS but it also complicated matters for it. In particular, it obliged it to contend 
with rival parties, including one based in Kabylia, the Rassemblement pour la Culture et 
la Démocratie (RCD), founded in February 1989 by a defector from the FFS, Dr Saïd Sadi, 
and legalised in September of that year. Nonetheless, the ability at last to operate openly 
within the law should have facilitated the activity of the FFS as a party advocating demo-
cratic reform. The question is why this did not happen. 
Contained Contention: The Legal FFS, 1989–2013
Three features of the FFS from its legalisation in late 1989 onwards are especially striking. 
The first is the abandonment of its roots in the Kabyle maquis;21 the second, the position of 
Aït Ahmed as its permanent, uncontested and unaccountable leader; and, third, its failure 
to call for democratic reforms. These features are connected.
The main elements of the FFS organisation in 1963 had been a number of units of the 
guerrilla forces in what had been wilaya III (Kabylia) and wilaya IV (Algérois) of the ALN 
during the war of independence. One of the principal leaders of the FFS from the outset 
and its military commander from early 1964 onwards was Abdelhafidh Yaha (1933–2016), 
widely known as ‘Si L’Hafidh’, a celebrated veteran of the ALN in wilaya III. It was Si L’Ha-
fidh who led the FFS delegation which negotiated the eventual cease-fire with the regime 
in June 1965. Thereafter he went into exile in France and acted as the deputy leader and 
principal organiser of the FFS there. In May 1989 he returned to Algeria to organise the 
FFS on the ground, rallying veterans and sympathisers from yesteryear, recruiting new 
supporters and preparing the FFS networks for their emergence as a legal party. Unknown 
to him, Aït Ahmed had appointed a certain Hachemi Naït Djoudi, a younger man (born 
1946) with no maquisard past, to act on his behalf. On 24 September 1989, Naït Djoudi 
submitted, in the FFS’s name, an application for legal recognition, which the Algerian 
authorities approved on 20 November, dismissing a formal challenge to this application 
from Si L’Hafidh.22 In this way, Aït Ahmed sloughed off the maquisard element of the FFS 
and obtained approval for a substantially new party in which his authority, no longer qual-
ified by the presence of distinguished ex-maquisards, would be unchallenged.
In December 1989 Aït Ahmed returned to Algeria after 23 years in exile in Lausanne, 
Switzerland. He remained in Algeria during 1990–1 but, following the army’s coup and 
the onset of violence in 1992, he left the country. Thereafter he directed the FFS from 
Lausanne, returning briefly in 1999 when he was a candidate in the presidential election. 
Throughout the period from 1992 to 2013, when he finally retired from the presidency of 
the party, Aït Ahmed relied on activists inside Algeria to conduct the party on the ground. 
The party had a national secretariat, composed of senior militants, each of whom had a 
defined area of responsibility, but these were themselves coordinated and led by a ‘first 
21  The guerrilla forces of the ALN.
22  ‘Algérie: Le parti de M. Aït Ahmed a été agréé.’, Le Monde, 22 November 1989.
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secretary’. The most striking feature of this arrangement was that, while party congresses 
elected a National Council which then appointed the members of the secretariat, Aït 
Ahmed himself chose the first secretary, who was appointed for a limited term and rarely 
allowed to serve two consecutive terms.23
Table 1. First Secretaries of the FFS, 1989–201624
Term of Office Name Wilaya of Origin
1989–90 Hachemi Naït Djoudi Tizi Ouzou
1990–1 Saïd Khelil Tizi Ouzou
1991–4 Ali Kerboua Bouïra
1994–6 Ahmed Djeddaï Algiers/Jijel
1996–7 Mustapha Bouhadef Tizi Ouzou
1997–9 Seddik Debaïli Algiers
1999–2000 Mustapha Bouhadef Tizi Ouzou
2000–2 Ali Kerboua Bouïra
2003–4 Djoudï Mammeri Bejaia
2004 Mustapha Bouhadef Tizi Ouzou
2004–7 Ali Laskri Boumerdès
2007–11 Karim Tabbou Tizi Ouzou
2011–13 Ali Laskri Boumerdès
2013–14 Ahmed Betatache Bouïra
2014–16 Mohamed Nebbou Algiers
2016– Abdelmalek Bouchafa Constantine
This regular rotation of the most senior figures of the FFS leadership in Algeria illustrated 
Aït Ahmed’s personal control over his party, in contrast to the situation that had devel-
oped during his exile from 1966 to 1989. As numerous observers noted, Aït Ahmed had 
accordingly come to resemble the traditional conception of the zaʿīm – an absolute and 
immovable leader – and this patently qualified the party’s democratic character. It also 
entailed a terrible wastage of political talent, as successive first secretaries subsequently 
left the party (see Table 1). In this way Aït Ahmed enlisted the energies of able members of 
the younger generation of political activists only to cast them aside once their brief mission 
at the apex of the party in Algeria was over. This tendency for senior FFS officials to quit the 
23  The main exception to this rule was Karim Tabbou; see Table 1.
24  Sources: Malika Hamraoui, Algerian Press Review, 15 January 1996; Liberté, 26 June 2004; FFS, 28 August 
2000 and 20 May 2001; El Watan, 23 September 2001; La Tribune, 23 March 2003; Le Soir d’Algérie, 8 May 
2012; El Watan, 2 October 2004; El Watan, 7 April 2007; FFS official website, 18 November 2011, available 
at http://www.ffs-dz.net/?p=378; ibid., 1 June 2013; El Watan, 9 August 2015.
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party was also connected to the party’s political positions, which were invariably decided 
by Aït Ahmed, at different junctures in the unfolding crisis of the Algerian state. 
Two distinct aspects of these positions should be considered: the party’s stance regard-
ing participation in the elections which the regime has held at intervals since 1989 and its 
position on the principal matters in dispute at different moments in the crisis since 1990–1.
The FFS and Elections 
In every election a key question has been whether the FFS would take part in and thereby 
legitimate the proceedings, or boycott and so de-legitimate them. Table 2 presents the 
party’s record in this regard.25
Table 2. FFS Attitudes to, and Fortunes in, Elections, 1990–2017
Date Nature of Election FFS Position
1990 APW and APC elections Boycotts, claims elections will be rigged, calls for abstention
1991 APN (legislative) elections Participates, wins 25 seats in first round (second round cancelled)
1995 Presidential election Has no candidate, calls for abstention
1997 APN elections Participates, wins 19 seats
1997 APW and APC elections Participates, wins 55 APW seats and 645 APC seats
1999 Presidential election Aït Ahmed candidate; withdraws just before poll, calls for abstention
2002 APN election Boycotts, calls for abstention
2002 APW and APC elections Participates, wins some APW seats, 684 APC seats
2004 Presidential election Has no candidate, calls for abstention
2007 APN election Boycotts, calls for abstention
2007 APW and APC elections Participates; wins 54 APW seats, 566 APC seats
2009 Presidential election Has no candidate, calls for abstention
2012 APN election Participates, wins 28 seats
2012 APW and APC elections Participates; has 20 APW seats, 954 APC seats, majority in 11 APCs
2014 Presidential election Has no candidate, calls for abstention
2017 APN election Participates, wins 14 seats
The FFS has regularly participated in local and regional elections, with one exception. In 
1990, the FFS boycotted the first ever pluralist elections in independent Algeria, claiming 
25  The Assemblées Populaires Communales (APC) are Algeria’s municipal councils, the Assemblées 
Populaires de Wilaya (APW) are the provincial-level councils and the Assemblée Populaire Nationale 
(APN) is the lower house of the Algerian Parliament.
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that they would be rigged. The spectacular success of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front 
Islamique du Salut, or FIS) in these elections, winning control of a majority in Algeria’s 
APC and APW, appeared to demolish this claim, but it may well have been merely a pretext 
for refusing to enter the lists for another reason. It is likely that Aït Ahmed, having only 
recently returned to Algeria after 23 years in exile and facing a rival party in Kabylia, Dr 
Saïd Sadi’s RCD, whose leaders had been present in the region throughout, wanted to 
‘count the RCD’s guns’ by giving it a clear run while simultaneously testing his own party’s 
influence by calling for abstentions. In the event, the RCD swept Kabylia on a very low 
turn-out,26 enabling Aït Ahmed to regard his abstention call as a success and to identify his 
rival’s distribution of support without placing his own party in electoral jeopardy. 
The FFS has participated in the elections for the lower house of parliament, the Assemblée 
Populaire Nationale (APN), except on two occasions. In 2002, party politics in Kabylia was 
overshadowed by the grassroots protest movement, the ‘Mouvement Citoyen’, which had 
arisen in response to the carnage of the ‘Black Spring’ of 2001, when gendarmes confront-
ing rioting youths shot dead 126 people and wounded many more. The FFS had initially 
been suspicious of, if not hostile to, the movement but subsequently sought influence 
within it and it was in these circumstances that it went along with the movement’s call to 
boycott the APN elections in May 2002, before breaking with it to contest the local and 
regional elections in the autumn of the same year.27 There was no comparable grassroots 
pressure on the FFS to boycott the 2007 legislative elections and it is unclear why it did so.
Since 2004, the FFS has consistently boycotted presidential elections by refusing to put 
forward a candidate and calling on Algerians to abstain. Its position during the night-
marish decade of the 1990s was another matter. It boycotted the election in 1995, but Aït 
Ahmed was a candidate in 1999 and returned to Algeria to campaign before withdrawing 
on the eve of polling day, together with the five other ‘opposition’ candidates standing 
against ‘the candidate of consensus’, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, on the grounds that the elec-
tion was rigged, a turn of events that infuriated Bouteflika, who was seen as ‘mal élu’ in 
consequence. 
Whatever may have been the particular calculations which informed the FFS’s behaviour 
in these various elections, its record has clearly been an erratic one. To the question of 
whether these elections have been valid democratic procedures, the FFS has signally 
failed to give a consistent answer.
26  Voter participation in the APC elections in Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia (the core wilayat of Kabylia) was 
22.82 percent and 27.08 percent respectively; in the APW elections it was 22.46 percent and 26.79 
percent respectively.
27  For a full discussion, see International Crisis Group, ‘Algeria: Unrest and Impasse in Kabylia’, Middle 
East/North Africa Report 15, 10 June 2003.
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The FFS and Debates over Policy
An equally striking aspect of its attitude to these elections is that it has never put forward 
suggestions or demands that address the question of their validity, that is, proposals to 
reduce the possibility of rigging or eliminate it altogether. An issue that arose in the leg-
islative elections of 1997 was the way the regime made it difficult for parties to have their 
representatives present to observe the conduct of the polls in many places and especially 
during the so-called ‘special vote’ of members of the armed forces, police, fire brigades 
and customs officers, who voted in their barracks and stations before polling day. It was 
not the FFS but an Islamist party, Abdallah Djaballah’s Mouvement de la Nahda (MN, 
previously Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique, or MNI), which put forward proposals to 
guarantee access for party representatives to such places in future contests, proposals that 
were accepted by the government and enshrined in a revised electoral law. 
This was not an isolated case. The FFS has never advanced serious proposals for realisable 
reform. Its policy positions from 1989–2013 served a different purpose. While there is no space 
here to recount these positions in detail, their main features can be sketched. These positions 
can be summarised as the ‘negative alternative’; the ‘empty chair’, and ‘unnatural alliances’.
The Negative Alternative
The first elections that the FFS contested were the legislative elections of December 1991. 
The principal contenders were the FIS on the one hand, offering a brand of Islamic popu-
lism, and the PFLN on the other, seen as the party of the status quo. The FFS campaigned 
on the slogan ‘Ni la République intégriste, ni l’État policier’ [Neither the fundamentalist 
republic nor the police state], condemning the FIS and the PFLN alike while offering no 
positive alternative vision. 
The Empty Chair
A feature of the FFS’s behaviour during the drama that unfolded from 1989–90 onwards 
has been its refusal at critical junctures to ally with other parties or to participate in con-
sultations to advance democratic positions when invited to do so.28 At least four instances 
of this conduct can be noted:
• In April 1991, eight parties joined forces to denounce the undemocratic electoral law 
introduced by Mouloud Hamrouche’s government; the FFS refused to join or endorse 
this alliance, despite the fact that it knew the electoral law was indefensible, as it even-
tually acknowledged.29
• In July 1991, following Hamrouche’s fall and the postponing of the legislative elec-
tions, veteran FLN politician Sid Ahmed Ghozali, heading a non-party caretaker 
government, invited Algeria’s parties to a meeting to try to frame a new electoral law 
so that the delayed elections could go ahead with agreed ground rules. The FFS ini-
tially accepted only to announce at the last moment that it would not take part after 
28  Algerian journalists call this repeated refusal to take part in the political debate of the moment la 
politique de la chaise vide.
29  See Aït Ahmed’s interview in the French daily Le Figaro, 7 June 1991.
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all. The meeting ended with no agreement and the PFLN-dominated national assem-
bly approved a revised electoral law that had calamitous consequences, namely the 
forbidding prospect of the FIS securing 75 percent of seats in the assembly with less 
than 48 percent of the vote and the support of barely 25 percent of the electorate.
• By mid-1994, the violence had reached horrific proportions and the new head of state, 
Liamine Zeroual, was struggling to arbitrate the policy division between those who 
favoured a strategy of brutal suppression of the Islamist movement (les éradicateurs) 
and those who advocated negotiations with the banned FIS (les conciliateurs). Inclined 
to favour the latter, he invited eight parties to talks in order to secure their support for 
his proposal to hold talks with the imprisoned FIS leaders. Only two of these parties 
(Ettahaddi and the RCD) towed the éradicateur line; the other six – the PFLN, Ahmed 
Ben Bella’s Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie (MDA), Abdallah Djaballah’s 
MNI,30 Mahfoud Nahnah’s HAMAS,31 Noureddine Boukrouh’s Parti du Renouveau 
Algérien (PRA)32 and the FFS – all favoured the conciliateur policy. The first five of 
these accepted Zeroual’s invitation. The two éradicateur parties predictably declined 
the invitation but so did the FFS, and the most promising initiative to end the vio-
lence faltered, then failed, and the slaughter went on. It is not certain that Zeroual’s 
initiative would have succeeded had the FFS supported it but it is indisputable that 
the FFS, at a critical juncture, refused to follow through on its championing of the 
conciliateur policy when invited by Algeria’s head of state to do just that.
• The fourth instance was a matter of boycotting an important debate. On 11 May 1996, 
President Zeroual circulated a memorandum containing a draft revision of the consti-
tution which he invited Algeria’s political parties and various associations to consider,33 
making it clear that he would take their views into account. The draft proposed offi-
cial recognition of l’Amazighité (the Berber dimension of the Algerian nation), an 
important concession to Kabyle opinion; in deference to secularist opinion it required 
Algeria’s Islamist parties to drop all explicit reference to Islam in their names; it also 
proposed to limit the presidency to two terms. But the centrepiece was the proposal 
to establish a ‘Council of the Nation’ that, as the upper house of the Algerian Parlia-
ment, would be able to act as an institutional curb on the excesses of a party (such as a 
re-legalised FIS) possessing a majority in the National Assembly. Instead of accepting 
this idea as facilitating the relegalisation of the FIS, Aït Ahmed and the FFS carica-
tured and condemned Zeroual’s proposal as anti-democratic and took no further part 
in the discussion. As a result there was no input from the ‘democratic’ wing of the 
Algerian political class and the most conservative elements of the regime were able to 
determine the fine print in the eventual revision.34
30  The MNI (which became the MN after 1996) located itself in both the Algerian nationalist tradition 
and that of the political Islamism pioneered by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood while refusing affilia-
tion to the latter out of nationalist scruples.
31  That is, Haraka li-Mujtama‘ Islami, ‘Movement for an Islamic Society’, recognised by the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood as its Algerian sister party.
32  Boukrouh located himself and his party in the intellectual tradition of the Algerian Islamic thinker, 
Malek Bennabi.
33  An English language summary of this memorandum and the entire French text were published in the 
Journal of Algerian Studies 1 (1996), pp. 117–31.
34  The FFS followed its rejection of Zeroual’s draft by calling for a ‘No’ vote in the referendum held to 
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Unnatural Alliances
Although the FFS has repeatedly played the lone ranger, it has not invariably done so. Fol-
lowing the army’s deposing of President Chadli on 11 January 1992, talks were held by the 
three parties that had won seats in the first round of the legislative elections on 24 Decem-
ber, that is the FIS, the PFLN and the FFS. The FIS and PFLN leaders met on 15 January 
and the FFS joined them the next day. The irony in the FFS consorting with the parties 
representing its two bêtes noires was not lost on observers,35 but it shared their interest in 
the continuation of the electoral process and could plausibly elevate this into a position 
of principle. Aït Ahmed subsequently declared there was no question of the FFS entering 
into an alliance with the FIS, but it is likely that the army commanders considered that an 
alliance of the three ‘Fronts’, if not yet sealed, was a serious prospect and would represent 
a major challenge to the legitimacy of their actions and to their authority.36 This prospect 
was decisively nipped in the bud when they had the FIS’s caretaker leader, Abdelkader 
Hachani, arrested on 22 January, an action that committed them to suppressing the FIS 
altogether, with all that this would entail. 
Whatever Aït Ahmed may have envisaged in January 1992, an alliance of the three ‘Fronts’ 
is precisely what he orchestrated three years later. Following the failure – for which the FFS 
bears some responsibility – of President Zeroual’s initiative in August–September 1994 and 
the success of les éradicateurs in the army leadership in preventing a negotiated end to the 
violence at that juncture, the FFS, together with the PFLN, the FIS, HAMAS, Ben Bella’s 
MDA, Djaballah’s MNI, Boukrouh’s PRA, Louisa Hanoune’s Workers’ Party and Abden-
nour Ali Yahia’s Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (LADDH), met 
in Rome on 21–2 November 1994 to agree a common position. A second meeting,37 held in 
Rome on 13 January 1995, published a joint ‘Platform for a Peaceful Resolution of Algeria’s 
Crisis’.38 While attracting much favourable publicity outside Algeria, this was rejected by 
the Algerian government and had no discernible influence on government policy or the 
course of events. It also caused unease within the FFS itself and provoked the departure 
from the party of one of its leading figures in Greater Kabylia, Saïd Khelil.39
The disposition to engage in what some Algerian observers have called ‘unnatural alli-
ances’ was already evident during the later years of the FFS in exile, when Aït Ahmed 
ratify the final version of the revision on 28 November 1996.
35  This development was publicly denounced by Hachemi Naït Djoudi, who broke with the FFS at this 
juncture.
36  On 19 January 1992 the FIS published an appeal calling for ‘a return to constitutional legality’ (Le 
Monde, ibid.), implicitly targeting the unconstitutional character of the army’s moves; on this point both 
the PFLN and the FFS could be expected to endorse its position.
37  Having refused to sign the joint communiqué at the end of the first meeting, neither HAMAS nor the 
PRA were invited to the second meeting. At both meetings the FIS was represented by Rabah Kebir, the 
president of its External Executive Committee based in Germany.
38  See Hugh Roberts, ‘Algeria’s ruinous impasse and the honourable way out’, International Affairs 71/2 
(April 1995), pp. 247–67, republished in Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002, Studies in a 
Broken Polity (London and New York: Verso, 2003), ch. 9.
39  Interview with Saïd Khelil, Tizi Ouzou, January 2003. Khelil had been elected to the National Assem-
bly for the constituency of Tizi Ouzou in the first round of the legislative elections on 26 December 1991 
and following Naït Djoudi’s departure had served as First Secretary of the party.
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formed an alliance with his old enemy, Ahmed Ben Bella, the pair of them announcing this 
at a press conference in London on 16 December 1985. This alliance did not lead anywhere 
or last long. Moreover, while the two leaders published a joint platform, their conceptions 
of how a democratic revolution might put an end to the dictatorial regime in Algiers were 
wide apart, Ben Bella looking to the recent revolution in Sudan while Aït Ahmed invoked 
the example of Poland’s Solidarnosc.40 This event was very much a deal between leaders, 
rather than the product of a real rapprochement between two parties as a result of a con-
vergence of perspectives in the course of a public debate. Criticised as such by Algerian 
scholar Ramdane Redjala,41 it was bitterly opposed by Abdelhafidh Yaha at the time and 
was the beginning of the parting of the ways between him and Aït Ahmed.
However, to suggest that such alliances have been unnatural is to presuppose that a 
democratic ideology has been the main constitutive element of the FFS’s nature and to 
overlook the fact that these incidents have provided a major clue to the FFS’s real nature. 
Aït Ahmed has engaged in alliances when it has suited him to do so. The point is that it has 
suited him to do so only when the alliance in question is formed at his initiative and never 
when the alliance or, more broadly, the procedure of public concertation is instigated by 
the government, even when the purpose of such a procedure is shared, in principle, by the 
FFS, as was the case with Zeroual’s attempt to rally support for his conciliateur initiative 
in August 1994. 
What this means is that actually achieving the adoption of the conciliateur policy was not 
the FFS’s priority in August 1994, any more than ensuring an agreed and valid electoral 
law was a priority in 1991. The FFS’s priority has clearly been to avoid being in any way 
implicated in or compromised by a political agreement with the Algerian authorities of the 
moment, whoever they are, even if they are disposed to adopt a policy the FFS approves 
and has advocated. Its fundamental and unwavering priority has been to sustain a perma-
nent challenge to the regime’s legitimacy.
Most if not all things have their end in their beginning. The FFS of 1989–2013 appeared a 
very different animal from the FFS of 1963. But the contemporary FFS existed in germ in 
the FFS of yesteryear; its overriding preoccupation with the question of legitimacy was in 
its DNA from the outset.
40  As I was personally able to observe at the press conference.
41  Ramdane Redjala, L’Opposition en Algérie depuis 1962: tome 1: Le PRS-CNDR; Le FFS (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1988), p. 176.
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Favret’s Gloss
Academic understandings of the FFS rebellion of 1963 have been heavily influenced by 
Jeanne Favret’s article, ‘Traditionalism through Ultra-Modernism’.42 Widely cited in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, it has been largely spared substantive criticism43 and has been 
explicitly endorsed by two prominent specialist writers on Kabylia, Alain Mahé and the 
late Mohamed Brahim Salhi.44 But at least two elements of Favret’s argument have been 
very misleading.
The first is her suggestion that the revolt expressed the ‘political discontent of the urban 
middle class’ of Kabyles in Kabylia and other towns,45 that this discontent had primarily 
socio-economic motivations, and that a key objective of the insurgents was to influence the 
new state’s economic policy.46 On the contrary, not only were middle class Kabyles in Algiers 
and the other main towns heavily dependent on state favour and inclined to keep their 
heads down47 but, above all, the politics of the FFS was not in any sense ‘representative’. 
In none of its rhetoric did it articulate the interests, grievances and aspirations of sections 
of the Kabyle or broader Algerian population at large, and its leader, Aït Ahmed, did not 
even articulate the outlook of his own troops, refusing to raise the question of Kabyle 
(or broader Berber) identity or express the opposition to single-party rule that animated 
many of them.
The second lies in her characterisation of the rebellion as ‘ultra-modernist’ in substance 
and ‘traditionalist’ only in form. This argument presupposed the absolute dichotomy 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies that was fundamental to the French colo-
nialist project. Favret was accordingly unable to recognise not only that all societies 
– including ‘modern’ ones – have traditions, but also that the principal tradition which the 
rebellion was remobilising was not that of pre-colonial Kabylia. 
Instead, it invoked the era dating from 1 November 1954 and the revolutionary tradition of 
the FLN, a movement that had developed its own characteristic and novel ways of doing 
things while simultaneously mobilising several of Algeria’s older traditions in pursuit of 
the modernist objective of constituting Algeria into a sovereign nation-state.
42  Jeanne Favret, ‘Traditionalism through Ultra-Modernism’, in Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud 
(eds), Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa (London: Duckworth, 1972), pp. 307–24; 
originally published as ‘La tradition par excès de modernité’, Archives européennes de sociologie VIII 
(1967), pp. 71–93.
43  Not one of the Algerian authors who have written about the FFS has engaged with Favret’s argu-
ment. I included a critique of this in my doctoral thesis, Political Development in Algeria: The Region of 
Greater Kabylia (Oxford University, D.Phil, 1980), published as Algerian Socialism and the Kabyle Question 
(Norwich: University of East Anglia Monographs in Development Studies 8, 1981), pp. 247–75.
44  Alain Mahé, Histoire de la Grande Kabylie, XIXe-XXe siècles: anthropologie historique du lien social dans 
les communautés villageoises (Paris: Éditions Bouchène, 2001), p. 436; Mohamed Brahim Salhi, Algérie, 
Citoyenneté et Identité (Algiers: Éditions Achab, 2010), p. 154, note 4.
45  Favret, ‘Traditionalism through Ultra-Modernism’, p. 319.
46  Ibid., p. 308.
47  Jean Morizot, Les Kabyles: propos d’un témoin (Paris: Publications du CHEAM, 1985), p. 221.
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These two errors led her into a third, the suggestion that, in so far as the rebellion’s troops 
were oriented, at least in part, by a backward-looking traditionalism, this was compen-
sated for by the modernism of the movement’s directing elite, a modernism she illustrated 
with the observation that ‘the “historic leader” doesn’t make use of his kinship with a 
prestigious maraboutic lineage’.48
The Autumn of the Maquisard
The FFS originated as a splinter from the historic FLN which Aït Ahmed had helped to 
found. The FLN was primarily based on the society of the mountains and its internal pol-
itics were informed by the traditions of this society, as I have explained elsewhere.49 Yet, 
unlike the FLN, the FFS of 1963–5 exhibited a decidedly protean aspect. In his discussion 
of movements contesting the new Turkish state in the Kemalist period, Gavin Brockett 
distinguishes between 
three distinct groups: collective public protests in which participants did not resort to 
force; […] violent insurrections against the state; and, active participation in Muslim 
tarikats and brotherhoods.50
Not least of the remarkable features of the FFS in its early days was the way it migrated 
into each of these three categories of collective action in turn.
Founded as the outcome of a series of discreet meetings held from early August to early 
September 1963 in Aïn el-Hammam,51 the FFS began as a semi-clandestine network distrib-
uting tracts that called on people to boycott the constitutional referendum of 8 September 
and the presidential election of 15 September 1963.52 It then emerged as a collective public 
protest, proclaiming its existence as a political party and denouncing the Ben Bella regime 
in large open-air meetings in Tizi Ouzou and Medea on 29 September and subsequently 
in other towns of the Kabylia region. 
When the regime responded by sending in the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP)53 to 
occupy these two towns, and subsequently all the urban centres in Kabylia and the main 
roads that linked them, the FFS stopped behaving like a political party almost as soon as 
it had started and mutated into a maquis, its units withdrawing to the hills after several 
48  Favret, ‘Traditionalism through Ultra-Modernism’, p. 319.
49  Roberts, The Battlefield, ch. 2.
50  Gavin D. Brockett, ‘Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a framework for the social 
history of the Atatūrk era, 1923–38’, Middle Eastern Studies 34/4 (1988), pp. 44–66: 48.
51  Abdelhafidh Yaha, FFS Contre Dictature: de la résistance armée à l’opposition politique (Algiers: Koukou 
Éditions, 2014), pp. 56–60.
52  The available statistics on turn-out in these two electoral consultations are unreliable but all observers 
agree that the FFS’s boycott call significantly reduced turn-out in Kabylia by as much as 50 percent.
53  So-called to distinguish it from the wartime ALN; the ANP which, as Minister of Defence, Boumediène 
was busy constructing, was built around the ALN of the frontiers which he had controlled since 1960, 
and incorporated some but not all of the old guerrilla units of the ALN of the interior.
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tense stand-offs with the ANP, notably at Ouadhia and Aïn el-Hammam itself.54 They did 
this for the most part without exchanging fire with government troops55 and at this point 
no blood was spilt. 
The onset of ‘la guerre des sables’ with Morocco on 14 October, with the armed clashes 
between ANP units and Morocco’s Forces Armées Royales (FAR) over the disputed border 
region around Tindouf in the Algerian Sahara, prompted the FFS both to announce a truce 
with the regime on 24 October56 and to send some of its own troops to support the ANP 
units confronting the FAR. The truce remained in force until 23 February 1964, when the 
FFS announced it was resuming hostilities;57 fighting at last took place and blood was 
shed. FFS units engaged in a number of clashes with ANP patrols across Kabylia and 
also conducted a campaign of assassinations, targeting mainly PFLN cadres but including 
an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Ben Bella. In response, the ANP aban-
doned its initially soft tactics,58 descending in heavy-handed fashion on mountain villages 
and carrying out hundreds of arrests,59 while the Police Judiciaire and the Police des 
Renseignement Généraux,60 not to mention the ‘popular militias’, also played their part, 
which included the resort to torture,61 in suppressing the rebellion. 
On 17 October 1964, Aït Ahmed was taken prisoner at the village of Ath Zellal in ʿarsh Ath 
Bouchaïb, a short distance from his native village of Ath Ahmed, and from then on the FFS 
was effectively led by Si L’Hafidh. But the rebellion had become a desultory and increas-
ingly demoralised affair, and it was Si L’Hafidh who led what was left of the FFS into 
negotiations, held in Paris, with a PFLN delegation on the terms of a definitive end to the 
revolt, which was announced in the Algerian daily El-Shaʿb on 16 June 1965. Ben Bella had 
neglected to secure Boumediène’s agreement to this and was deposed three days later. 
But the new Council of the Revolution chaired by Boumediène honoured the terms of the 
PFLN–FFS agreement and Aït Ahmed, who had been condemned to death on 9 April 1965 
but had subsequently had this sentence commuted by Ben Bella to imprisonment, was 
allowed to escape into exile in May 1966.
The way in which the FFS migrated from the category of armed insurrection into Brock-
ett’s third category of ‘Muslim tarikats’, that is, what Algerians would call turuq (plural of 
54  Yaha, FFS Contre Dictature, pp. 66–9; Redjala, L’Opposition en Algérie depuis 1962, p. 149.
55  FFS and ANP units exchanged fire (without occasioning any casualties) at Larbaa n’Ath Irathen (Yaha, 
FFS Contre Dictature, p. 66) but apparently nowhere else.
56  David Ottaway and Maria Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1970), p. 98.
57  Redjala, L’Opposition en Algérie depuis 1962, p. 153.
58  That the ANP units acted carefully and even tactfully at first is attested by several FFS veterans; see 
Mohand Arab Bessaoud, Le FFS: Espoir et Trahison (Paris: Imprimerie Cary, 1966), p. 88 and Yaha, FFS 
Contre Dictature, p. 64.
59  Several thousand people were arrested in all; 3,000 imprisoned FFS militants and suspects were 
released by the Boumediène regime shortly after it took power in June 1965.
60  The counterparts, respectively, of the CID and Special Branch in the United Kingdom.
61  Saïd Smaïl, Mémoires Torturées: Un journaliste et écrivain algérien raconte (Paris and Montréal: L’Har-
mattan, 1997), t. 1, pp. 37–67.
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tarīqa, or Sufi order) will become clear only once other aspects of the movement have 
been delineated. The first particularly striking feature of the FFS’s trajectory between 
August 1963 and June 1965 is the way it evolved from collective leadership to what Alge-
rians sardonically call ‘un one-man show’, with Aït Ahmed acquiring the status of zaʿim. 
The meetings in August–September 1963 to found the movement were attended by a 
panoply of major figures, by no means all of them Kabyle. In addition to Aït Ahmed and 
Si L’Hafidh, these included three ALN colonels (Mohand ou ’l-Hadj, Amar Ouamrane and 
Slimane Dehilès) and three commandants (Lakhdar Bouregaa, Mohamed Slimani and 
Amar Bouakkache); several prominent civilian veterans of the revolution (Abdennour Ali 
Yahia, Belaïd Aït Medri, Maître Mourad Oussedik and Aboubakr Belkaïd) and the mayor 
of Aïn el-Hammam, Kaci Naït Belaïd. 
By the time Aït Ahmed was in custody, nearly all these had fallen by the wayside. Three of 
them – Bouakkache, Naït Belaïd and Aït Medri – were killed in the course of the revolt, but 
most of the others simply quit. Two of them dropped out early on: Ouamrane and Slimani 
attended the first meetings but decided against further participation and withdrew. The 
others – Mohand ou’l-Hadj, Lakhdar Bouregaa, Slimane Dehilès – were initially enthusias-
tic and put themselves on the line, at least for a while. Veteran guerrillas who had proved 
their courage time after time, they quit, not because they could not handle the pressure, 
but because they had ceased to believe in the project. The same could be said of the 
civilian figures who rallied to the FFS only to distance themselves from it subsequently, 
notably Ali Yahia. So what was the FFS’s purpose at its inception? 
The Rhetoric and the Calculus
At 10am on 29 September 1963, Mourad Oussedik read the Proclamation of the FFS to a 
large crowd assembled in front of the town hall in Tizi Ouzou. The text of this proclama-
tion is edifying in several ways.62 The regime was denounced as not only ‘personal’ and 
‘dictatorial’ but even ‘neo-fascist’ and as such counter-revolutionary. The FFS presented 
itself as the guardian of ‘the Revolution’, credited itself with a developed organisation 
(and, in particular, a ‘Central Committee’) and assumed the authority to pronounce the 
regime ‘illegal’. The constitution that had recently been massively approved in a referen-
dum everywhere except Kabylia was dismissed as a ‘pseudo-constitution’. ‘The People’ 
(despite their regrettable ratification of the pseudo-constitution) were invoked as the 
repository of revolutionary virtue but assigned no role other than that of witness to the 
impending duel between the resurgent Revolution (the FFS) and the Counter-Revolution.
So much for what the Proclamation contained. What was absent from it matters as much 
if not more. For a start, there was no reference either to Kabylia or to the Berber iden-
tity; this followed, entirely coherently, from Aït Ahmed’s concern to avoid the charges 
of ‘regionalism’ and ‘Berberism’ in order to present the movement as the heir to the rev-
62  For the text of this see Yaha, FFS Contre Dictature, pp. 62–3.
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olutionary FLN of 1954–62 and accordingly national in character. But to emphasise the 
absence of references to regional and identity concerns misses the key point, which is that 
the Proclamation made no demands of any kind whatsoever. 
There was no lack of both social and political grievances in Kabylia in 1963. The region 
– a major bastion of the ALN throughout the war – had been hammered by the French 
army, especially during the ‘Jumelles’ operation conducted by General Challe in 1959–60. 
Hundreds of villages had been destroyed, many thousands of people killed, many more 
thousands of women widowed and children orphaned, and scores of thousands of people 
displaced. The social and economic dislocation and human distress in the region were 
intense and a major concern of Colonel Mohand ou ’l-Hadj, as he and his officers found 
themselves powerless to alleviate the plight of the endless stream of destitute war widows 
besieging them in the headquarters of the 7th military region.63 
These concerns, while unusually intense, were not unique to Kabylia and could have fur-
nished the basis for a platform of demands that would have elicited understanding and 
support throughout Algeria. The advent of an authoritarian single-party regime was also 
intensely resented by many of the guerrilla veterans of the old wilaya III; there is evidence 
that it was the fundamental political concern of some of them, notably Si L’Hafidh.64 Here 
again, a demand which targeted this issue could have won support beyond Kabylia and 
those parts of the Algérois where the FFS had a presence. Nowhere in the proclamation 
does the FFS mention the single-party system.
The FFS was not in the business of representative politics. At no point was it interested in 
articulating the concerns of the population in order to secure the redress of grievances. Its 
politics were of a different kind.
The refusal to contest the principle of the single party was not an oversight. The argument 
implicit in the proclamation was that the root of the problem was the ‘oriental despotism’, 
‘dictatorial power’ and ‘personal regime’ of Ahmed Ben Bella and the detestable police 
methods and ‘constitutional coups’ employed to establish, secure and legitimate this. It 
was in virtue of these considerations that the regime was damned as ‘neo-fascist’; the 
principle of the single party as such was not in question. This is because Aït Ahmed at this 
juncture was not opposed to this principle. Whatever the revolutionary rhetoric may have 
suggested, his purpose was to secure a redistribution of power and responsibility within 
the single-party regime rather than overthrow it by force. The central demand to this end 
was for a proper party congress to be held. As he stated in the summer of 1963, 
Only a congress will be able to bring about the regrouping of these vanguards, the 
condition sine qua non of the resumption of the revolution. You will ask me ten ques-
tions, I will give you a single reply: the congress.65
63  Ibid., p. 52.
64  Author’s interviews with Si L’Hafidh (Abdelhafidh Yaha), Tizi Ouzou, April 1999 and Paris, August 
2000.
65  My translation; the text of the interview is reprinted in Hocine Aït Ahmed, La Guerre et l’Après-Guerre 
(Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964), p. 177.
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This statement gives us the essence of Aït Ahmed’s purpose and objective. Intensely 
resentful at the way he, a ‘historic chief ’, had been marginalised by the evolution of the 
Ben Bella regime, he looked to a party congress to rectify matters and to a carefully cal-
ibrated rebellion to pressure Ben Bella into calling this. The way in which the National 
Constituent Assembly (in which he sat) was pre-empted in August 1963 by a meeting 
of the party in drawing up the Constitution led him to radicalise his rhetoric, but not to 
attack the principle of the single party. Within hours of the Proclamation of the FFS, Aït 
Ahmed declared at a press conference in Aïn el-Hammam that ‘in principle, we are not 
opposed to a dialogue with our adversaries.’66
This second statement enables us to assess the charge of ‘neo-fascism’ at its true value. The 
ploy was to denounce the regime as illegitimate in the most vehement terms in order to put 
it under pressure to make the concession its critics required if they were to come round to 
acknowledging its legitimacy. The reason the revolt continued and, from late February 1964, 
turned violent, was that Ben Bella would not offer Aït Ahmed the deal he sought. 
There are accordingly grounds for considering the FFS rebellion a failure, if not a fiasco. 
It obliged, to no clear purpose let alone profit, the population of Kabylia, barely recovered 
from the repression it suffered during the war of liberation, to endure a reprise of this 
trauma all over again, with the ANP pursuing the imjuhad much as the French army had 
pursued the imjuhad not long before.67 But to register only the rebellion’s failure and count 
only its costs is to miss several of its effects.
Despite Failure, a Transformation
However novel a ‘contentious social movement’ may appear, it may also be – at any rate in 
its inception – a fresh move in a longstanding game. The FFS rebellion polarised the polit-
ical field in Kabylia in a novel way but in doing so reconfigured elements that pre-dated it. 
The dynamic of this process was an intense if largely covert struggle for the leadership of 
refractory Kabyle opinion.68
In the summer of 1962, the division in Kabylia was between the supporters of the ‘Tlemcen 
group’, as the Ben Bella–Boumediène alliance was called before it took possession of 
Algiers, and the partisans of its main opponents, Belkacem Krim and Mohamed Boudiaf, 
known as the ‘Tizi Ouzou group’. The success of the ‘Tlemcen group’ in seizing power and 
consolidating its position spelt the end of the Krim–Boudiaf alliance, and Boudiaf went 
his own way, founding the Parti de la Révolution Socialiste (PRS), with most of its support 
outside Kabylia. 
66  Le Monde, 1 October 1963.
67  The Arabic word mujahid – roughly, ‘fighter’ – (plural: mujahidūn, -īn) becomes amjahed (plural 
imjuhad) in the Kabyle dialect (Thaqbaylith) of Thamazighth (the Berber language).
68  In developing this analysis I am very much in agreement with John Chalcraft’s argument about the 
importance of leadership; see John Chalcraft, Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 39–46.
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The inability of the Ben Bella regime to immediately bring order out of chaos, let alone 
give appreciable relief to the widespread economic and social distress, combined with its 
resort to high-handed treatment of its critics, ensured that one year on, in June–July 1963, 
Kabylia was still fertile ground for opposition currents. The new alliance that began to take 
shape was that of Krim and Mohand ou ’l-Hadj, who was the only wilaya commander to 
have retained his position, the renaming of the ALN’s wilaya III as the ANP’s 7th military 
region being little more than a change in nomenclature at this point. This alliance began to 
plan an initiative that would challenge Ben Bella’s regime; they had the support of Si L’Ha-
fidh and most of the 7th military region’s troops but wanted to know whether Aït Ahmed, 
who had refused to take sides the previous year, would now rally to the cause. 
What happened next is still rather obscure, but it is clear that Aït Ahmed was unwilling to 
enlist in the Krim–Mohand ou ’l-Hadj project. According to his own account, he refused 
to join or back them because they were planning a violent action of some kind while he 
was committed to a non-violent strategy as a matter of principle.69 This version is con-
tradicted by Si L’Hafidh70 and in any case runs into the objection that Aït Ahmed’s FFS 
itself resorted to force before long. It is virtually certain that Aït Ahmed’s objection to the 
Krim–Mohand ou ’l-Hadj project was that it was led by Krim and that he could not bring 
himself to serve under him. The upshot was that the FFS was formed, with Aït Ahmed 
as its ‘Secretary General’, as an alternative to the earlier plan and was launched at Krim’s 
expense, and had the effect of definitively marginalising him and driving many of his fol-
lowers into political retirement or support for the government. 
The evolution of the FFS revolt had a similar effect on many other personalities. Mohand 
ou ’l-Hadj, who had always doubted Aït Ahmed,71 seized on the crisis with Morocco to rally 
to the regime, securing the promise, which was honoured, of a party congress (originally 
Aït Ahmed’s central demand) and the release of political prisoners; he would subsequently 
figure in Boumediène’s Council of the Revolution before definitively retiring from politics. 
Colonel Slimane Dehilès eventually followed Amar Ouamrane into political retirement; 
Abdennour Ali Yahia would serve as a minister in the Boumediène regime before subse-
quently concentrating on his law practice until circumstances in the mid-1980s prompted 
him to launch the Algerian human rights movement; another activist, Mohand Arab Bess-
aoud, went into exile in France, where he founded the Académie Berbère in Paris in 1966. 
By the end of the FFS revolt, despite its failure, Aït Ahmed had succeeded in establish-
ing his personal position as the paramount leader of the Kabyle challenge to the regime. 
Furthermore, a major premise of the way his subsequent leadership of the FFS would 
resemble that of a zaʿīm was in place. The only other tendency present in Kabylia from 
late 1965 onwards was the loyalist tendency headed by leading figures who accepted the 
legitimacy of the regime and sought to work within it.72 For the FFS, the loyalist tendency 
69  Hocine Aït Ahmed, L’Affaire Mecili (Algiers: Bouchene, c. 1991), pp. 111–13.
70  Si L’Hafidh claims that the project was to launch a new opposition party, not mount a coup (Yaha, 
FFS Contre Dictature, pp. 45–9).
71  Ibid., pp. 49–522.
72  This tendency included major figures from the Kabyle maquis who had never been tempted to join 
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were les Kabyles de service (KDS), whom it denounced en bloc as ‘Kabyle Uncle Toms’, a 
judgment that ignored their often entirely respectable motivations as patriots serving the 
Algerian nation-state. 
This polarisation of the political field in Kabylia survived until 1980 if not longer. In the 
mid-1970s, dissident opinion in Kabylia was very much inclined to view Aït Ahmed in his 
Swiss exile as the defeated Scottish Jacobites had viewed Bonnie Prince Charlie, ‘the King 
over the water’.73 The rise of the Berberist movement within the younger generation with 
the explosion of the ‘Berber Spring’ in 1980 complicated the situation, but did not imme-
diately transform it. Dissidents were still inclined to damn any Kabyle serving the Algerian 
state as simply one of the KDS and Si L’Hafidh was a very positive reference for young 
Berberists in his home district of Iferhounène when I was doing fieldwork there in 1983.
Tarīqa
Maître Mourad Oussedik, the man who read the FFS Proclamation to the expectant crowd 
in Tizi Ouzou on 29 September 1963, was the scion of a notable family of Aïn el-Hammam. 
The Oussedik family are not merely notables; they are imrabden, a saintly lineage, what 
the French call marabouts. The Ath Ahmed are imrabden also. Not simply the imrabden of 
Taqa, the leading village of ʿarsh Ath Yahia, they are also a branch of the most influential 
saintly lineage in the whole of the Jurjura region, the Ath Sidi Ahmed.74 It was this lineage, 
by then affiliated to the Rahmaniyya tarīqa, who provided, in Lalla Fadhma n’Soumeur 
and her brother Sidi Tahar, the leaders of the resistance to the French conquest of Greater 
Kabylia in 1857. When the sheikh of the Rahmaniyya proclaimed jihad against French rule 
in 1871, it was the leading saint of the Ath Ahmed of Taqa, Sidi Mohand ou ’l-Hocine, who, 
foreseeing the revolt’s failure, advised against it. 
The founder of the FFS is conventionally identified as Hocine Aït Ahmed. In fact, his given 
name, as registered in the État Civil and as entered in the electoral lists in 1962 and 1991, 
was Mohand ou ’l-Hocine; after his great uncle (his grandfather’s brother), the saint.
The ‘maraboutic’ aspect of the FFS has been an occasional theme of the discourse of the 
RCD, its Kabyle rival since 1989, but this has mainly been expressed in rancorous mutter-
ings on websites. As far as I am aware, it has never been the object of extended analysis 
and has been entirely missed by academic as well as journalistic observers. At present, I 
know of two main reasons for taking this aspect seriously.
A curious detail of Aït Ahmed’s career is the fact that, when he was elected to the National 
Assembly in 1962, it was not in the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou, where he came from, but in the 
wilaya of Setif. When he was elected to the National Assembly in 1991, it was again in 
the FFS and other prominent Kabyle personalities who had served the Revolution in civilian capacities.
73  Interviews with young Kabyles in Jurjura villages in 1975 and 1976.
74  I discuss the role of the imrabden of the Jurjura region and the Ath Sidi Ahmed in particular in Roberts, 
Berber Government, pp. 228–46.
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Setif. On this occasion, however, unlike 1962, the wilaya as a whole was not the constit-
uency; far smaller districts performed this function. The constituency where Aït Ahmed 
stood for election was Beni Ourtilane (or Beni Warthīlān), a reclusive ʿarsh in the Guer-
gour mountains. Two distinguished men of religion are associated with it: Sheikh Hussein 
al-Warthīlāni (1710–79),75 and, more recently, an interesting member of the Association of 
the ʿulama’, Sheikh Fodhil al-Warthīlāni (1906–59). 
There is evidence that the people of Beni Warthīlān had a longstanding relationship with 
Hocine Aït Ahmed and that this was a premise of his candidacy in 1962 as in 1991. His 
death was an occasion for particularly emphatic mourning in this community.76 But the 
basis of Aït Ahmed’s relationship with the ʿarsh as a whole was his prior relationship with 
a particular village in the area: Anou, birthplace of Fodhil al-Warthīlāni. Anou is an entirely 
saintly settlement, a village of imrabden; it was here that Aït Ahmed established his cam-
paign headquarters in the legislative elections of 1991.77
The second piece of evidence is provided by the Proclamation of the FFS in 1963. The 
claim to be the resurgence of the Revolution was predicated on the characterisation of 
the Ben Bella regime as neo-fascist and, accordingly, counter-revolutionary. This char-
acterisation was a piece of rhetorical exaggeration, as was the FIS’s later denunciation of 
the Algerian state as ‘impious’ (kufr). The function of both denunciations was to license 
the remobilisation of the revolutionary tradition against the state. In the case of the FIS, 
this rhetoric was an instance of the radical Islamist ploy of takfir, the denunciation of a 
supposedly Muslim state as impious in order to justify rebellion against it, so that the 
rebellion can be considered jihad (defence of the umma) and accordingly licit in terms of 
classical Sunni doctrine, rather than fitna (division of the umma) and so illicit. What of the 
earlier instance, that of the FFS in 1963?
Saintly lineages in the Maghreb are distinct from the lay population. In Kabylia, a sharp 
distinction has traditionally been drawn between the latter, leqbayel, and the imrabden, who 
are credited with Arab and often Sherifian78 ancestry and so not regarded, strictly speaking, 
as Kabyles. As Ernest Gellner demonstrated in his classic study of the Ihansalen in the High 
Atlas of Morocco,79 the saints are outside the rivalries of the lay tribesmen, do not bear arms 
and are obligatorily pacific. They are accordingly available to mediate in disputes between 
clans and tribes, being recognised by all as impartial. The only context in which saints may 
engage in fighting is the jihad and in doing so they may and often do assume leadership roles.
In his version of the events of June–July 1963, Aït Ahmed claims that he refused to join the 
projected Krim–Mohand ou ’l-Hadj initiative because they were planning a coup de force, 
while he insisted on an entirely peaceful strategy. In his various public criticisms of the Ben 
Bella regime before that moment, Aït Ahmed had refrained from describing it as ‘neo-fas-
75  For Sheikh Hussein al-Warthīlāni’s outlook, see Roberts, Berber Government, pp. 211–21, 228, 248, 284–5.
76  Kamel Ouhnia, ‘Beni Ourtilane pleure sons fils adoptif ’, Liberté, 26 December 2015.
77  Ibid.
78  Descending from Hasan ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Mohammed.
79  Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969).
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cist’, while playing the amrabed’s classic role of mediator of disputes – exhorting all sides 
to respect and talk to one another – with his insistent call for a party congress. He ups the 
rhetorical ante only on 29 September 1963. That he did so suggests that he anticipated the 
regime’s counter-moves and that these would put paid to the FFS’s prospect of functioning 
as a political party, forcing it to revert to the maquis. By denouncing the regime as ‘neo-fascist’ 
when he did, he justified in advance his movement’s eventual resort to force. The regime, as 
the product of the revolutionary war of liberation – popularly conceived and experienced as 
jihad – had an obligation to remain true to the Revolution. Aït Ahmed, as a founder-member 
of the revolutionary FLN, assumed the authority to remobilise this tradition against Ben 
Bella and thus to call, implicitly, for a resumption of jihad. The denunciation of the regime 
as ‘neo-fascist’ represented the secularisation of the Islamic procedure of takfir.
I have described Aït Ahmed’s leadership of the FFS from 1989 onwards as approximat-
ing to that of a zaʿīm. But I say ‘approximating’ because I consider that it was actually 
closer in form and spirit to the role of a leader of a Sufi order, a tariqa. A tariqa has a clear 
hierarchy, with the paramount charismatic sheikh at the apex, his numerous lieutenants – 
al-muqaddemīn – acting in the sheikh’s name and on his behalf at the middle levels of the 
organisation, and the rank and file adepts – al-ikhwān – at the base. This is a fundamental 
element of the logic that underlay the organisation and functioning of the FFS and a big 
part of the reason why Aït Ahmed insisted on being buried among his ancestors, in the 
exclusively maraboutic village where he had been born.
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
Term Definition
ʿarsh A group of villages forming a stable political community
ALN Armée de Libération Nationale, armed wing of the FLN, which successfully 
fought the War of Independence against French colonial rule
ANP Armée Nationale Populaire, the Algerian armed forces, successor to the ALN
APC Assemblées Populaires Communales
APN Assemblée Populaire Nationale
APW Assemblées Populaires de Wilaya
FFS Front des Forces Socialistes, led by Hocine Aït Ahmed
FIS Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front)
FLN Front de Libération Nationale, Algeria’s principal nationalist movement during 
the War of Independence (1954–62)
GPRA Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, the FLN’s government-
in-exile during the latter part of the War of Independence
HAMAS Haraka li-Mujtama‘ Islami, (Movement for an Islamic Society), the Algerian 
sister party of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
imjuhad The Kabyle Thamazighth translation of the Arabic mujahidīn, ‘those who 
engage in jihad’
imrabden The Thamazighth form of the Arabic murabitun (in French ‘marabouts’; sing. 
murabit): members of a saintly lineage, often affiliated to a Sufi order.
KDS ‘Les Kabyles de service’, a derogatory term (used by the FFS) for Kabyles loyal 
to the PFLN regime
LADDH Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, a human rights 
movement led by Abdennour Ali Yahia
maquis The guerrilla forces of the ALN
MDA Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie, led by Ahmed Ben Bella
MNI / MN Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique (which after 1996 became simply the 
‘Mouvement de la Nahda’), led by Abdallah Djaballah
PFLN Party of the FLN, the FLN’s post-Independence political movement and the 
country’s sole legal political party until 1989
PRA Parti du Renouveau Algérien, led by Noureddine Boukrouh
PRS Parti de la Révolution Socialiste, led by Mohamed Boudiaf
PT Parti des Travailleurs (Workers’ Party), led by Louisa Hanoune
RCD Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie, led by Dr Saïd Sadi
tarīqa Literally ‘path’, the term refers to a Sufi order
umma The wider Islamic community
zaʿīm Literally ‘boss’ or ‘chief’, an absolute and immovable leader
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